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Evidence Code Section 771:
Conflict With Privileged
Communications

Section 771 of the California Evidence Code embodies the common
law rule of production under the doctrine of present recollection revived
which grants an adverse party the right to compel the production of a
writing used by a witness to refresh his memory for the purpose of testifying.' The statute allows the witness to secure his best possible memory by
imposing no restrictions on the type of writing which may be used to
refresh recollection, and guards against false or manufactured testimony by granting an adverse party the right to inspect the refreshing writing
and to cross-examine the witness concerning it.2 Despite the salutary
purpose of this rule, recent cases suggest that, as codified in section 771,
it is susceptible to abuse as a general discovery device which may be
employed to reach even privileged communications to which a witness
referred before testifying at trial or deposition.8
The purpose of this comment is to develop a critical analysis of section
771 with particular emphasis on that statute's apparent overexpansion
of the scope of production to include privileged communications.
First, the historical development of the expanded scope of production
under section 771 will be explored, with emphasis on the factors giving
rise to a conflict with those sections of the Evidence Code which protect
privileged communications from compelled disclosure. This discussion
will be followed by an examination of the nature of the conflict and
the judicial response to date. Finally various approaches for resolving
the conflict will be considered including a suggested amendment to section 771 and the privilege statutes.
1. See text accompanying note 18 inlra. For a comprehensive discussion of
present recollection revived see C. McCORMICE, EVIDENCE §9 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as McCoRMIcK]; 3 WiGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§758-765 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as 3 WIGmORE]. For the treatment of the rule in California see J.
McBAINB, CALIFoRNIA EVIDENCE MANUAL §§293-300 (2d ed. 1960) (Supp. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as McBAiNE]; B. WrrIN, CAIRNIA EVIDENCE §§1167-1170 (2d ed.
1966), (Supp. 1974) [hereinafter cited as WrrXIN].
2. McCoRmicK, supra note 1, §9, at 17; 3 WMoPE, supra note 1, §758.
3. See text accompanying notes 48-71 infra.
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PRESENT RECOLLECTION REVIVED IN CALIFORNIA

A.

Two Theories Confused

Prior to 1967, the rule granting an adverse party the right to inspect a
writing used by a witness to refresh his memory was codified in former
section 2047 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4 This statute failed to distinguish the common law doctrine of present recollection revived
from the superficially similar but theoretically distinct doctrine of
past recollection recorded. 5 The ramifications of this doctrinal interfu-

sion are illustrated by a brief discussion of the major differences between
the two theories. Past recollection recorded 6 is generally regarded as an

exception to the hearsay rule whereby evidence of a witness' former observations which are contained in a writing is admissible after a proper

foundation has been laid to establish the writing's trustworthiness.7 In
order to lay a proper foundation under former section 2047 the proponent had to establish the following facts: (1) that the writing was made
by the witness or under his direction; (2) that the writing was made
at the time when the event occurred or when it was still fresh in the witness' mind; and (3) that the witness knew that the facts as stated in
the writing were true. 8 Once these facts were established, the authenti-

cated writing simply became a record of the past recollection of the
witness, and the witness was permitted to read the contents of the writing into evidence 9 even though he retained no present recollection of

the facts. In contrast, under the doctrine of present recollection revived, the witness testifies from an independent memory which has

been refreshed by an examination of the writing. 10

Unlike past

4. CAL. CODES, Civil Procedure §2047, at 531 (1872), repealed, CAL. STATS. 1965,
c. 299, §126, at 1366, effective Jan. 1, 1967:
A witness is allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written by himself, or under his direction, at the time when the fact was fresh in
his memory, and he knew that the same was correctly stated in the writing.
But in such case the writing must be produced, and may be seen by the adverse
party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read
it to the jury. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing, though he
retain no recollection of the particular facts, but such evidence must be received with caution.
5. For an excellent presentation on the relationship between past recollection recorded and present recollection revived under former section 2047 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, see Comment, The Forgetful Witness: Refreshing Memory and Past Recollection Recorded, 3 U.C.L.A.L. Rv. 616 (1956).
6. For a discussion of the development of the doctrine of past recollection recorded see MCCORMICK, supra note 1, §§276-280; 3 WiGMopE, supra note 1, §§734-755.
For a treatment of the law in California see McBmANE, supra note 1, §295; Wrr=N,
supra note 1, §§1171-1173.
7. McCoRmicK, supra note 1, §276; 3 WiGMoE, supra note 1, §734.
8. See note 4 supra.
9. Estate of Moore, 180 Cal. 570, 583, 182 P. 285, 291 (1919). The memorandum itself, however, was not admissible into evidence. Hawkins v. Sanguinetti, 98
Cal. App. 2d 278, 284, 220 P.2d 58, 62 (1950).
10. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, §9; 3 WiGMom, supra note 1, §758.
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recollection recorded, the trustworthiness of the refreshing memorandum is not a necessary precondition to the admission of the witness'
testimony. 1 The writing itself is merely an aid to stimulate the
mind of the witness, and testimonial trustworthiness is adequately assured by granting the adverse party the right to inspect the writing and
2
cross-examine the witness concerning it.'
As a result of the amalgamation of the doctrines of past recollection
recorded and present recollection revived under former section 2047,
the strict foundation requirements imposed under the former doctrine
3
were unnecessarily applied in the latter.
Furthermore, in People v. Gallardo14 the California Supreme Court
imposed an additional limitation by holding that former section 2047
permitted production of writings for inspection only when the witness
used them to refresh his memory while on the stand.15 Because of these
restrictions upon the scope of writings subject to production, the only
writings available to an adverse party under former section 2047 were
those which the witness had caused to be made when he had firsthand
knowledge of the facts therein, and which had been used by the witness
to refresh his memory while on the stand. This situation was radically
changed with the enactment of section 771 of the Evidence Code. 0
B.

Expanded Scope of Production
Former section 2047 of the Code of Civil Procedure was repealed in
1967 simultaneously with the effective date of the new Evidence Code.
With the enactment of the new law, the legislature clearly distinguished
the doctrines of past recollection recorded and present recollection revived by affording each a separate section in the Code. Past recollection
recorded is codified in section 1237 of the Evidence Code and substantially embodies the common law foundation requirements set forth
under former section 2047 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1 The rule of
11. See McCopmrcK, supra note 1, §9; 3 WiGMoRE, supra note 1, §758; WrrnIN,
supranote 1, §1170.
12. McCORMIcK, supra note 1, §9, at 17.
13. See Comment, The Forgetful Witness: Refreshing Memory and Past Recollection Recorded, 3 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 616, 633-34 (1956). But see McCoRMicx, supra note
1, §9, at 16, referring to the improper use of foundation requirements to establish the
trustworthiness of a writing used to refresh memory: "Even if the latter requirement
is a historical or analytical blunder, it will be none the worse if it is a safeguard needed
in the search for truth."
14. 41 Cal. 2d 57, 257 P.2d 29 (1953).
15. Id. at 66-67, 257 P.2d at 35-36. Although it represents the majority view, the
"at trial" limitation which was adopted by the court in Gallardo has not gone without
criticism. E.g. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, §9, at 17; 3 WIGMORE, supra note 1, §758.
16. CAL. STATs. 1965, c. 299, §2, at 1297-1370, effective Jan. 1, 1967.
17. CAL. Evm. CoDiE §1237. Under the new law, foundation requirements have
been liberalized to the extent that the writing may be made not only by the witness himself but also by some other person for the purpose of recording the witness' statement

1975 / Privileged Communications

production under the doctrine of present recollection revived is embodied in section 771 of the Evidence Code which provides in part:
(a) [I]f a witness, either while testifying or prior thereto, uses a
writing to refresh his memory with respect to any matter about
which he testifies, such writing must be produced at the hearing
at the request of an adverse party and, unless the writing is so
produced, the 'testimony of the witness concerning such matter
shall be stricken.
(b) If the writing is produced at the hearing, the adverse party
may, if he chooses, inspect the writing, cross-examine the witness
concerning it, and introduce in evidence such portion of it as may
be pertinent to the testimony of the witness.' s
Unlike its predecessor, section 771 imposes no restrictions in the form
of foundation requirements upon an adverse party's right to demand
production other than the requirment that a witness must have used the
writing "to refresh his memory with respect to any matter about which
he testifies."' 19 In addition, the new law repudiated the Gallardo limitation by including within the scope of writings subject to production a
writing used by a witness to refresh his memory before taking the
stand. 20 As a result, under section 771 an adverse party may theoretically compel the production of any writing used by a witness to refresh
his memory, without regard to its origin, authenticity, the time of its
making, or the time it was used by the witness to refresh. The only
express statutory exception to this absolute rule of production is found
in subsection (c) of the statute which provides that production is excused if the writing is not in the possession or control of the witness or
proponent or if the writing is not reasonably procurable by such party
through use of the court's process or other available means. 2 '
C. Overexpansion
Former section 2047 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not require
the imposition of sanctions in the event of noncompliance with a request
at the time it was made. Comment-Assembly Committee on Judiciary, CAL. EvnD.
CODE §1237. Under section 1237 it appears that the witness may be required to show
a lack of present recollection. WrrxN, supra note 1,-§1173.
18. CAL. EvnD. CODE §771.
19. Id. It is the responsibility of the trial judge to make a finding as to whether
the writing did in fact refresh the witness' memory, and if he does not so find, an order
compelling production will be denied. Morgan v. Stubblefield, 6 Cal. 3d 606, 493 P.2d
465, 100 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972). Upon a finding that the writing did refresh, the trial
judge is apparently without discretion as .to the application of the rule. See B. Jar'RSee text accompanying
SON, CALiFORNmA EvIDENCE BENcHBOox §27.16, at 390 (1972).
notes 22-31 infra.
20. Comment-Assembly Committee on Judiciary, CAL. EvnD. CODE §771: "If a
witness' testimony depends upon the use of a writing to refresh his recollection, the adverse party's right to inspect the writing should not be made to depend upon the happenstance of when the writing is used."
21. CAL. EVID. CODE §771(c).
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for production by an adverse party. The statute simply provided that if a
witness refreshed his memory from a writing that satisfied that section's
foundation requirements, then "in such case the writing must be
produced, and may be seen by the adverse party ....
22 In light of
the absence of sanctions for noncompliance with the rule of production,
the language of former section 2047 can be regarded as essentially directory in nature. 23 As a predictable consequence of this discretionary
language and the extremely limited scope of production under former
section 2047, conflicts between that statute and those protecting privileged communications from compelled disclosure were apparently not
very common. 4 Probably the most logical explanation for this is that
counsel could avoid production of any writing under former section
2047, whether or not privileged, by simply allowing the witness to refresh his memory before taking the stand.25 In any event, former section 2047 posed no appreciable threat as a potential discovery device
for privileged communications.
This is not the case, however, under section 771 of the Evidence
Code. Although abolition of the unnecessary foundation requirements
and the "at trial" limitation imposed under prior law is in accordance
with the views of leading commentators, 26 the expanded scope of production occasioned by these changes potentially encompasses any writing, including privileged communications.27 Furthermore, section 771
has ostensibly eliminated any element of judicial discretion in its application by mandating that a writing used to refresh a witness' memory
"must be produced" at the request of the adverse party or "the testimony
of the witness concerning such matter shall be stricken. 28 As a general
22. See note 4 supra (emphasis added).
23. "The requirements of a statute are directory, not mandatory, unless means be
provided for its enforcement." Gowanlock v. Turner, 42 Cal. 2d 296, 301, 267 P.2d
310, 312 (1954); see McCrea v. Haraszthy, 51 Cal. 146, 150 (1875). See also People
v. Sigal, 235 Cal. App. 2d 449, 455, 45 Cal. Rptr. 481, 485 (1965); C. SANDS, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§57.02-57.08, 58.01-58.06 (1973).
24. Two cases, Dwelly v. McReynolds, 6 Cal. 2d 128, 56 P.2d 1232 (1936) and
Inoye v. McCall, 35 Cal. App. 2d 634, 96 P.2d 386 (1939), dealt with demands for
production under former Code of Civil Procedure Section 2047 of police accident reports
claimed to be protected from such production under former Vehicle Code Section 488,
CAL. STATS. 1935, c. 27, at 173.
Because the latter statute protected only the accident
report itself, but not its contents when embodied in another writing, production was permitted pursuant to former section 2047. However, as noted by one commentator, a reasonable implication might be drawn from those decisions that, had a privilege been
found, production would have been denied. Title, Police Accident Reports, 43 CAL.
S.B.J. 711, 717 (1968).
25. See, e.g., People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal. 2d 57, 257 P.2d 29 (1953); People v.
Grayson, 172 Cal. App. 2d 372, 341 P.2d 820 (1959); Smith v. Smith, 135 Cal. App.
2d 100, 286 P.2d 1009 (1955).
26. E.g., McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, §9, at 17; 3 Wrmoa, supra note 1, §§758,
762.
27. See text accompanying notes 17-21 supra.
28. CAL. EVD. CODE §771(a) (emphasis added).
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rule of construction, where a statutory provision contains language of

command accompanied by mandatory sanctions for noncompliance,
there is a presumption that the legislature intended to remove any element of judicial discretion in the application of the statute. 29 This interpretation of the legislative intent is strengthened by another rule of construction which provides that a change from discretionary language, as
used in former section 2047, to mandatory language, as used in section
771, is presumed to be intentional.3 0 The overexpansion of the scope

of production under section 771 was thus primarily caused by its mandatory language which eliminated any element of judicial discretion in
honoring a demand for production and which admits of no exception
for privileged communications. 3 ' In light of this overexpansion, conflict
between section 771 and those statutes protecting privileged communi-

cations was inevitable.
CONFLICT WITH PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS

A.

Nature of Conflict
The purpose of the rule of production codified in section 771 of the

Evidence Code is to help insure the reliability of a witness' testimony.
Contrasted with the purpose of section 771 and most other rules of evidence is the purpose underlying privilege statutes which is the protection

of certain communications from disclosure for reasons of policy unrelated to the reliability of the information involved.3 2 The more familiar

statutory privileges protecting confidential communications are found
in the Evidence Code. 3 These include the attorney-client privilege, 4
doctor-patient privilege,35 psychotherapist-patient privilege,36 clergyman-penitent privilege,3 7 and the marital privilege." Before a commu29. Gowanlock v. Turner, 42 Cal. 2d 296, 301, 267 P.2d 310, 312 (1954); Adler
v. City Council of City of Culver City, 184 Cal. App. 2d 763, 774, 7 Cal. Rptr. 805,
812 (1960). See also Olsen v. Superior Court, 175, Cal. 250, 165 P.706 (1917); C.
SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONS'rUCTION

§57.08 (1973).

30. Western States Newspapers, Inc. v. Gehringer, 203 Cal. App. 2d 793, 799, 22
Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (1962).
31. Another factor in the overexpansion of the scope of production under section
771 which indirectly promotes the conflict with privileged communications is the language of the statute that ostensibly permits production of the entire writing although
only a portion of the writing may have actually refreshed the witness' memory. See
text accompanying notes 86-88 infra.
32. Comment-Assembly Committee on Judiciary, CAL. Eva). CODE §910; McCORMrCK, supra note 1, §72.
33. Other privilege statutes which might conflict with section 771 of the Evidence
Code are: CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §2016(b) (attorney's work product privilege); CAL.
Rav. & TAX. CODE §19282 (income tax returns); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§1094,
2111 (employment information).
34. CAL. Eva). CODE §§950-962.
35. CAL. EvIa. CODE §§990-1007.
36. CAL. Eva). CODE §§1010-1026.
37. CAL. Eva). CODE §§1030-1034.
38. CAL. EvIn. CODE §§980-987.
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nication will be protected from compelled disclosure, the code requires
that the appropriate relationship exist between the parties and that the
communication be of a confidential nature, but protection will be denied
a communication meeting these requirements when it falls within a statutory exception to the privilege, or when the privilege has been
waived.39
Because the special protection extended to privileged communications tends to suppress relevant evidence and thus impede the search
for truth, communications are not protected from disclosure in California unless they enjoy a privilege specifically recognized by statute, 40 and
the statutes which grant privileges are strictly construed. 41 However, once it is found that a communication meets the requirements for a statutory privilege then disclosure generally 42 cannot be
compelled-the legislature has made a determination that it is more important to keep certain information confidential than it is to require disclosure of all information relevant to the issues in a pending proceeding.43 Furthermore, there are many other provisions embodied in the
California codes which are designed to insure the confidentiality of privileged communications. Thus, communications made in the course of
the attorney-client, physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, clergyman-penitent, or marital relationship are presumed to be confidential; 44
the privilege protecting such communications extends to all "proceedings" 5 and pretrial discovery; 46 and the trial judge or presiding officer is
expressly charged with the responsibility of excluding privileged information when there is no person present at the proceeding to claim the
privilege.47 As a result of the absolute nature of the privilege statutes, the
California courts have been faced with what appears to be an irreconcilable conflict between the language of those statutes and section 771 of
the Evidence Code, which makes mandatory the production of any
writing used to refresh a witness' memory. The courts have responded
39. See CAL.EviD. CODE §§912, 950-1034.
40. CAL. Evm. CODE §911.
41. See, e.g., Dwelly v. McReynolds, 6 Cal. 2d 128, 131, 56 P.2d 1232, 1234
(1936);,Samish v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. App. 2d 685, 695, 83 P.2d 305, 310 (1938).
42. Not all privileges in the Evidence Code are absolute. For example, the privileges embodied in Evidence Code sections 1040 and 1041 (official information and identity of informer) are expressly conditioned upon a finding that the necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the
interest of justice. The privilege embodied in Evidence Code Section 1060 (trade
secret) is conditioned on a finding that the allowance thereof will not conceal fraud or
work an injustice.
43. Comment-Assembly Committee on ludiciary, CAL. Evm. CODE §910.
44. CAL. Evm. CODE §917.
45. CAL. Evm. CODE §910.
46. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. §2016(b).
47. CAL. EviD. CDE §916(a) (2).
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with decisions that reflect both their impatience with the conflict and

their ingenuity in evading it.
B.

JudicialResponse

Thus far no appellate court has required the production of a privileged writing under section 771, and all of the decisions have indicated
that the judiciary is unwilling to allow the statute to be used as a device
for compelling disclosure of privileged communications. On the other

hand, the appellate courts have consistently avoided directly resolving
the issue of whether privilege statutes should control over an adverse
party's right to compel production. The courts have evaded the crux of
the problem by finding, often on questionable grounds, either that there
was a waiver of any privilege that might have existed, or that section 771
was somehow inapplicable.
Kerns Construction Co. v. Superior Court48 was the first appellate

decision to address the problem. Kerns, as cross-defendant, took the
deposition 49 of a Mr. Reynolds who was an employee of the cross-complainant, Southern Counties Gas Company. Reynolds was questioned

with regard to certain facts about which he had no independent recollection but which were contained in reports prepared by him. It was necessary for Reynolds to "refresh his memory"' ," by reading from the reports
48. 266 Cal. App. 2d 405, 72 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1968).
49. While two other California decisions have sub silentio permitted the use of section 771 as a pretrial discovery device, the propriety of this practice has yet to be directly challenged. See Morgan v. Stubblefield, 6 Cal. 3d 606, 493 P.2d 465, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1972); Sullivan v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 64, 105 Cal. Rptr. 241
(1972). One possible objection to employing section 771 in this manner may be found
in the language of the statute itself which expressly restricts the time of production to
the "hearing." Section 145 of the Evidence Code makes it clear that the hearing referred to is that "at which a question under the Code arises, and not some earlier or
later hearing," and California decisions have construed "hearing" to mean either a judicial or administrative proceeding where evidence is presented or questions of law or fact
are determined. E.g., People v. Ivenditti, 276 Cal. App. 2d 178, 80 Cal. Rptr. 761
(1969). A deposition is not a hearing but a proceeding used to discover facts for trial
preparation, and the officer taking the deposition is not competent to rule on the questions of refreshment, privilege, or waiver. CAL. CoDE Civ. PRoc. §2019c. Thus it is
arguable that the legislature never intended section 771 to be available to a deposing
party as a pretrial discovery device.
Another possible ground for objection to the use of section 771 as a pretrial discovery
device may be found in Greyhound v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 364 P.2d 266,
15 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1961). In Greyhound, the California Supreme Court held that the
Discovery Act provided adequate protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
because of the statutory requirement for "good cause," taken together with the wide discretion afforded the trial judge under the Act to limit discovery. Id. at 393-95, 364 P.2d
at 386-87, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 110-11. These safeguards are not available under section
771, and thus, as applied to pretrial discovery, it is arguable that the statute may be subject to attack on constitutional grounds.
50. The fact that Reynolds had no independent recollection of the facts and was
unable to testify without reading from the report would indicate that his memory was
incapable of being refreshed. Thus, section 771 was not properly applicable. People
v. Parks, 4 Cal. 3d 955, 960-61, 485 P.2d 257, 260, 95 Cal. Rptr. 193, 196 (1971). See
text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
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in order to give testimony, and this was inexplicably permitted by Southern's attorney. Yet when deposing counsel requested that the identified
reports be appended to the deposition, the attorney for Southern objected on the ground that the reports were protected under the attorneyclient privilege.
The trial judge agreed that the reports were privileged, but disposed
of any conflict with the statutory command to order production under
section 771 by finding that production was excused within the meaning
of subsection (c) of that statute. 51 Apparently, the trial judge construed
the statutory language so that, by virtue of being privileged, the report
was not "in the possession or control"'52 of either Reynolds or Southern,
nor "reasonably procurable by [Southern] through the use of the court's
' Such a construction cannot be
process or other available means."53
squared with the fact that the report actually belonged to Southern.
However, in light of the appellate court's resolution of the case, there was
no further discussion of this issue. The appellate court reversed, noting
that although a privileged communication is protected from compelled
disclosure, section 912 of the Evidence Code provides that the privilege
is waived if the holder of the privilege discloses a significant part of the
communication or consents to such a disclosure by another. 4 Southern's failure to assert the attorney-client privilege before Reynolds had
disclosed a substantial portion of the report operated as a waiver of the
privilege, and production of the report was ordered pursuant to section
771.r 5
Although a waiver was correctly found in Kerns, the mere fact that a
witness testifies from a memory refreshed by a privileged writing does
not automatically cause a waiver by disclosure. This is because the witness may not disclose a significantpart of the communication.5" A basis
for this argument may be found in People v. Aikin51 wherein the court
apparently found that the testimony of a defense witness who had refreshed his memory from a report protected by the attorney-client privilege was insufficient to cause a waiver of that privilege. 8 The Aikin
court, however, avoided a direct confrontation between the attorneyclient privilege and section 771 by finding a previously unrecognized
51. 266 Cal. App. 2d at 409, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
52. CAL. EvID. CODE §771(c)(1).
53. CAL. EviD. CODE §771(c)(2).
54. 266 Cal. App. 2d at 412-14, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 78-79.
55. Id.
56. Cf. Mize v. Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 46 Cal. App. 3d 436, 449, Cal. Rptr. - (1975).
57. 19 Cal. App. 3d 685, 97 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1971), overruled, People v. Lines,
13 Cal. 3d 500, - P.2d -, 119 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1975).
58. See 19 Cal. App. 3d at 694-96, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 257-59.

620
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exception to the privilege. In Aikin the defendant was examined by a
court appointed psychiatrist in order to provide the defendant's attorney
with information concerning the defendant's mental status. The psychi-

atrist's confidential report, which was delivered directly to the attorney,
was acknowledged as being initially protected by both the psychother-

apist-patient privilege and the attorney-client privilege.59 However, because the defendant tendered the issue of his mental condition by assert-

ing the defense of insanity, he brought the psychiatrist's report within
the express statutory exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege
found in section 1016 of the Evidence Code. 60 Although there is no

analogous express statutory exception to the attorney-client privilege
the appellate court interpreted those code sections which delineate the

attorney-client privilege as permitting such an exception and affirmed
the trial court's ruling which granted production of the report to the
prosecution under section 771.61

The rationale underlying the Aikin

court's ruling was discredited by the California Supreme Court in People v. Lines.62 In Lines the court expressly overruled Aikin insofar

as that decision approved a client-litigant exception to the attorneyclient privilege. 63 However, because a demand for production under
section 771 was not made in Lines, the dilemma presented by the conflict between that statute and privileged communications was not addressed by the high court.

In two other recent cases, privileged writings were examined by a witness before testifying, but the adverse party's request for production under Evidence Code Section 771 was denied. In one case the court found
59. Id.
60. Id. at 694, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
61. Id. at 697, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 259. Apparently the defendant did not raise the
issue of a possible violation of the privilege against self-incrimination resulting from the
prosecution's use of section 771 to compel the defendant to produce information which
might have helped to establish his own guilt. In People v. Chavez, 33 Cal. App. 3d
454, 109 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1973), the court noted that the right of the prosecution in
a criminal case to inspect documents under section 771 should be limited by the rule
laid down in Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 327, 466 P.2d 673, 677-78,
85 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133-34 (1970), where it was held that the privilege against selfincrimination prohibits the state from compellng the defendant to disclose information
during pretrial discovery which might serve as a "link in the chain" of evidence tending
to establish guilt. This rule was expanded to discovery at trial in People v. Bais, 31
Cal. App. 3d 663, 107 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1973). As stated in Chavez:
such inspection should [be] limited to
[I]n view of the Prudhomme rule....
an inspection of the matters to which [the witness] testified and not to an
inspection of the entire statement without a prior examination [by the trial
judge] to determine whether the statement [contains] matters which would aid
the prosecution's case other than matters in the statement testified to by the
witness.
33 Cal. App. 3d at 462, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 163. For a discussion of other factors which
should be considered with regard to an in camera examination by the court of writings
subject to production under section 771, see text accompanying notes 75-87 infra.
62. 13 Cal. 3d 500, - P.2d -, 119 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1975).
63. Id. at 513-14, - P.2d -, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
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that the memorandum did not in fact refresh the witness' memory and
therefore refused to strike his testimony.64 The second decision, Sullivan
v. Superior Court,6" illustrates a more provocative solution to the problem. In Sullivan, plaintiff's attorney conducted an interview with his client concerning the events surrounding an automobile accident. This interview was tape recorded, and the recording was later transcribed by
the attorney's secretary. The client used the transcription to refresh her
memory before deposition. 6 Upon the defendant's demand for production of the writing pursuant to section 771, the petitioner refused on the
ground that it was protected by the attorney-client privilege. The court
agreed that the interview as transcribed was a privileged communication
and further found that there had been no waiver.0 7 After pointing out
the conflict between the language of section 2016(b) of the Code of
Civil 'Procedure on the one hand (exempting privileged communications from discovery) and section 771 of the Evidence Code on the other
(compelling production of any writing), the court stated:
The various statutes may be harmonized by holding that the word
"writing" in section 771 was never intended to mean a transcription
of a client's original discussion with her attorney concerning an
accident as to which she is employing his legal services.6 8
In support of its decision the court noted that a transcription of an electronic recording was "far removed" from the type of writing generally
associated with refreshing a witness' memory.6 9
There appear to be two weaknesses in the Sullivan court's reasoning.
First, the court made no reference to section 250 of the Evidence Code
which defines "writing" to include all forms of tangible expression, including sound recordings.70 Thus, within the literal meaning of that statute, not only the transcription, but the recording itself would be a "writing" subject to production if used by the witness to refresh his memory.
Second, the theoretical considerations which prompted the abolition of
the strict foundation requirements imposed under former section 2047
of the Code of Civil Procedure are not consistent with the court's interpretation of section 771 of the Evidence Code; that is, under the doctrine of present recollection revived in California there is no limitation
64. Morgan v. Stubblefield, 6 Cal. 3d 606, 623 n.11, 493 P.2d 465, 477 n.11, 100
Cal. Rptr. 1, 13 n.11 (1972); B. JF.FFEEsoN, CALrFORNi EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK §27.16,
at 388 (1972).
65. 29 Cal. App. 3d 64, 105 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1972).
66. See note 49 supra.
67. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 73, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 74, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
70. CAr.. EvD. CODE §250.
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upon the type of writing that may be used by a witness to refresh his
memory, 71 and any such writing is potentially subject to a demand for
production by an adverse party. Denial of a request for production
should be based upon a finding that the writing is privileged, not upon
what is effectively a judicially imposed "foundation" requirement bearing no relationship to the purposes of the privilege statutes or section
771.
It is apparent from the preceding cases that courts have yet to squarely
face the direct conflict between section 771 and the Evidence Code
provisions protecting privileged communications. The harmony between the competing statutes sought in the Sullivan decision cannot be
attained so long as the mandatory provisions of section 771 admit of no
exception for privileged writings. However, once it is acknowledged that
the language of the conflicting statutes is irreconcilable, it will be the
task of the courts, through judicial construction, or the legislature, by
statutory amendment, to determine which of these provisions should
control.
RESOLVING THE CONFLICT

A.

JudicialConstruction

Under accepted principles of statutory construction, 72 a judicial interpretation of the California Evidence Code is possible which would
completely exempt privileged communications from production under
section 771. This result would follow from the application of either one
of two rules of construction. The first rule provides that when two provisions of a statute are inconsistent, then a specific provision will control
over a general one. 73 It may be argued that the specific provisions of the
Evidence Code, which protect privileges by detailing the relationships
and circumstances which must exist before a communication will be
protected from compelled disclosure, should control over the more general language of section 771, which permits the production of any writing used by a witness to refresh his memory. The second rule of construction provides that when an irreconcilable conflict exists between two
sections of a statute, the later provision in point of position controls over
the earlier provision, though both were enacted at the same time.74 The
71. Comment-Assembly Committee on ludiciary, CAL. Evm. CODE §771. See
text accompanying notes 17-21 supra.
72. For a survey of statutory rules of construction pertinent to this comment see
F. McCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSlEucTION §§8-9, at 43-49 (1953); C. SANDS, STATUTES
AN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§50.01-51.08, 57.01-58.06 (1973).
73. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1859. See Penaat v. City of San Jose, 24 Cal. App.
3d 707, 710, 101 Cal. Rptr. 258, 260 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 984 (1972).
74. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Tulare, 30 Cal. 2d 832, 186 P.2d 121 (1947).

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 6

Evidence Code was enacted as a single statute in 1965, 7 and the provisions that protect privileged communications are found between sections 950 and 1034 of the Code. 76 Thus arguably they should prevail
over section 771-the presumption being that the latter part of the statute was last considered." Such an interpretation would permit the specific language of the privilege statutes to control over the more mechanical features of section 771, and a judicial finding that a writing is
privileged would constitute an absolute bar to production under the latter section.
B. Statutory Amendment
Whether by judicial construction or through statutory amendment, a
resolution of the conflict which totally exempts privileged communications from production under section 771 does not necessarily represent
the best possible balance between the purposes served by the competing statutes. This is because a finding that a writing is privileged would
necessarily preclude its examination by the trial judge for the purpose
of determining whether the writing has in fact refreshed the witness'
memory, 78 and if so, whether there has been a significant disclosure of
the writing sufficient to constitute a waiver of the privilege. 79 These
questions are of course crucial in determining whether an adverse
party's demand for production under section 771 should be honored,
yet it could be argued that unless the court is granted access to the privileged writings, it will be without adequate information to rule intelligently on either question. In some cases the judge might be able to
make such a ruling based on his voir dire of the witness without examining the allegedly privileged information in the writing.80 However, if
the witness is evasive, or if the necessary facts are otherwise unavailable
to the court, it will be difficult for the judge to make an objective determination as to whether there has been a significant disclosure sufficient
for a waiver.8 ' As a result, it may be possible for a witness or party
75. CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 299, at 1297.
76. CAL. Evm. CODE §§950-962, 980-987, 990-1007, 1010-1026, 1030-1034.
77. See People v. Dobbins, 73 Cal. 257, 14 P. 860 (1887); Estate of Beech, 63
Cal. 458 (1883); Odd Fellows Say. Bank v. Banton, 46 Cal. 603 (1873); see also 45
CAL. JuR. 2d, Statutes §80, at 599.
78. See note 19 supra.
79. See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
80. See B. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENC E BENCHBOOK §27.16, at 388 (1972).
Another approach was apparently taken in Mize v. Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.,
46 Cal. App. 3d 436, 446 - Cal. Rptr. - (1975), wherein the trial judge permitted
the witness himself to decide which portions of a writing refreshed his memory. Although a witness' opinion in this regard may be a most important factor in the court's
finding, an admission or denial of refreshment by the witness clearly should not in itself
be conclusive. See text accompanying notes 92-93 infra.
81. Professor Wigmore implicitly recognized this difficulty when he stated:
There is always the objective consideration that when his [holder of the
privilege] conduct touches a certain point of disclosure, fairness requires that
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to tender the contents of a writing into evidence, through the witness'
testimony, while successfully relying on a mere claim of privilege to
deny an adverse party his right to compel the production of information
necessary to test the witness' credibility on cross-examination.
The legislature has attached a great deal of significance to the protection of the right to production by an adverse party, as evidenced by
the mandatory language of section 77182 which is not found in other
statutory schemes for compelling the production of writings.8 3 It is suggested that it would be inconsistent with this legislative intent to permit
a refreshing writing which has lost its privileged status to escape inspection by an adverse party merely because the trial judge is denied the
information necessary to rule on the questions of refreshment and
waiver. Therefore, it is submitted that a more favorable accommodation between the goals of the conflicting statutes may be found in a
legislative amendment to section 711 that would require, at the
request of the adverse party, an in camera examination by the
trial judge of a privileged writing reviewed by a witness before
testifying if the judge would otherwise be without adequate information
to rule on the questions of refreshment or waiver. If no waiver could be
found, production for the benefit of the adverse party would be denied.
Such an amendment would also require a corresponding revision of the
Evidence Code sections protecting privileged communications to allow
this procedure.8 4 These provisions would serve to harmonize the irreconcilable language of the competing statutes while extending the maximum degree of protection to an adverse party's right of production, that
is consistent with the essential confidentiality necessary to maintain the
effectiveness of the privilege statutes. Of course compelled disclosure
of potentially privileged information to the trial judge would operate
to slightly lessen the degree of protection afforded most privileged comhis privilege shall cease whether he intended that result or not. He cannot
be allowed, after disclosing as much as he pleases, to withhold the remainder.
He may elect to withhold or to disclose, -but after a certain point his election
must remain final.
8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §2327 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (emphasis added).
82. See text accompanying notes 22-31 supra.
83. Nonprivileged writings may be subject to discovery pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure Sections 2031 (production of writings for inspection) or 1985 (subpoena
duces tecum). Discovery of writings under the Discovery Act is subject to the discretion
of the trial court. CAL. CoDa Civ. Pnoc. §2019(b) (1); Greyhound v. Superior Court,
56 Cal. 2d 355, 380-83, 364 P.2d 266, 283-84, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 106-08 (1961); see
also WrrKm, supra note 1, §946.
84. Since Evidence Code Sections 954 (attorney-client), 980 (marital), 994 (physician-patient), 1014 (psychotherapist-patient), and 1033 and 1034 (clergyman-penitent) absolutely preclude the trial judge from compelling disclosure of the privileged
communication, these sections would require amendment to allow the in camera inspection suggested in this comment. There are several privileges in the Evidence Code
which do not absolutely preclude disclosure; thus no amendment to these sections would
be required. See note 42 supra.
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munications. However, provision could be made to insure that the trial
judge would maintain the confidentiality of the writings involved, 85 and
the concomitant advantage to the cause of testimonial reliability would
seem to justify such a limited disclosure.
C. Other Factorsin a Complete Statutory Amendment
For reasons not directly related to the conflict with privileged communications, but nonetheless important to a complete amendment, the
provision for an in camera examination by the trial judge should also
extend to all nonprivileged refreshing writings. Under the proposed
amendment, after a writing has been found subject to production (i.e.
the writing refreshed the witness' memory and, if privileged, the privilege was.waived) the trial judge would then examine the writing for the
purpose of excising any material not related to the witness' testimony.
Although section 771 now expressly provides that only those portions of
the writing pertinent to the witness' testimony may be introduced into
evidence, 6 there is no such restriction upon the adverse party's right to
inspect. Consequently, even though only a single sentence contained
in a report may truly refresh a witness' memory, section 771 would ostensibly permit production of the entire "writing."8 This result is possi85. Such a procedure is not without precedent. Section 915(b) of the Evidence
Code makes express provision for an in camera disclosure of information for the purpose
of ruling on a claim of privilege under Evidence Code Sections 1040 (official information), 1041 (identity of informer), or 1060 (trade secret). Section 915(b) specifically
charges the trial judge with the responsibility of maintaining the confidentiality of the
privileged information. The special nature of these privileges is indicated in note 42
supra.

86. CAL. EvIm. CODE § 771(b).
87. Thus, in Kems Construction Co. v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. App. 2d 405, 72
Cal. Rptr. 74 (1968), the adverse party apparently obtained the production of an entire
accident report, and in People v. Aiken, 19 Cal. App. 3d 685, 97 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1971),
overruled, People v. Lines, 13 Cal. 3d 500, -

P.2d -,

119 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1975), the

prosecution successfully compelled the production of what was apparently a complete
psychiatrist's report. A recent decision, Mize v. Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.,
46 Cal. App. 3d 436, - Cal. Rptr. - (1975), departed from this approach by expressly
limiting the adverse party's right to production to only those portions of a file which
actually refreshed the witness' memory. The decision is noteworthy because it is the
first case which recognizes that under section 771 not all material in a refreshing writing
should be subject to production. However, the court in Mize did not restrict production
to those portions of the file which, although used to refresh the witness' memory, were
related to the subject matter of the testimony given. Thus, Mize arguably compelled
disclosure of more than section 771 requires. See text accompanying notes 48-61 supra.
88. Support for such an in camera examination by the trial judge may be found in
the Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 612 (effective July 1, 1975):
If it is claimed that the writing contains matters not related to the subject matter of the testimony the court shall examine the writing in camera, excise any
portion not so related, and order delivery of the remainder to the party entitled
thereto. Any portion withheld over objections shall be preserved and made
available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
Further, dicta in a recent California appellate decision indicates that under certain circumstances such a procedure may even be constitutionally mandated. People v. Chavez,
33 Cal. App. 3d 454, 462, 109 Cal. Rptr. 157, 163 (1973). See note 61 supra.
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ble despite the fact that most of the information in the writing might not
be relevant either to the witness' testimony or to the subject matter of
the action. Therefore the advantage of interposing the trial judge for
the purpose of excising unrelated material is that it would effectively
limit an adverse party's right to production to only that information necessary to accomplish the purpose of the rule-securing the best memory of the witness-while guarding against imposition by false or manufactured testimony. The proponent's files would thus be protected
against unwarranted intrusion while the adverse party's right to adequate information with which to effectively cross-examine the witness
would be preserved. 88
D. DiscretionaryApplication of the Rule of Production: An
Alternative?
As previously discussed, it is the mandatory provisions of section 771
that are primarily responsible for the conflict with privileged communications.8 9 This fact suggests that one way of harmonizing the competing
statutes would be an amendment that would simply make the application of section 771 discretionary with the trial judge. The problem with
such an approach is that it necessarily results in a lesser degree of protection for an adverse party's rights under section 771 by interposing an
additional condition (the trial court's approval) before he is entitled to
inspect pertinent portions of the refreshing writing. Thus, even if the
court found that the refreshing writing was not privileged, it could deny
the adverse party access to information related to the witness' testimony
that might be necessary for a thorough cross-examination of the witness.
However, because judicial discretion in the application of the rule of
production under the doctrine of present recollection revived is permitted in many jurisdictions" and enjoys the support of leading commentators, 91 this approach may appear to be an attractive alternative to the
more complicated amendment proposed in the preceding section.
Therefore it is important to examine briefly the arguments propounded
in support of a discretionary rule of production in order to determine
89. See text accompanying notes 22-31 supra.
90. E.g., FED. R. EviD. 612, effective July 1, 1975. Rule 612 apparently allows
the court no discretion with regard to the production of a writing used by a witness while
testifying. However, if a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory before taking
the stand, protection is discretionary with the court, as was the case under prior federal
law. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). For specific state citations
referring to discretionary application of the rule, see Annot., 82 A.LR.2d 473, 489-91,
557-66 (1962); Annot., 125 A.L.R. 19, 24-34, 64-69, 207-08 (1940).
91.

E.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 1, §9, at 17; 3 WiGMORE, supra note 1, §§755,

765; see Maguire & Quick, Testimony: Memory and Memoranda, 3 How. L.J. 1, 1-2,
12-14, 20-21 (1957).
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whether they are sufficient to justify this approach to the California law.
The two arguments most often set forth in support of conditioning the
rule of production upon the discretion of the court are quite unrelated to
the conflict with privileged communications. The first argument urges
that, consistent with his power to control the manner of examination, the
trial judge must have total discretion so that he may deny the use of a
writing as an aid to memory when he regards the danger of undue
suggestion as outweighing its value to genuinely stimulate memory. 2
That is, testimonial reliability may be insured by keeping from the witness a writing that might lead him into imaginative fictionY 3 This view
may be appropriate in jurisdictions which permit a witness to refresh his
memory from a writing only while in the presence of the court, but it is
inapposite under section 771. This is because the California law imposes
no limitations upon the type of writing that a witness may use to refresh
his recollection or upon the time when the witness may refer to such a
writing. Thus, as a practical matter, it is naive to think that the trial
judge can successfully insulate the witness from all improper stimulants
to his memory. Section 771 already provides an essential safeguard by
charging the court with the responsibility of determining whether the
writing did in fact refresh the witness' memory (as distinguished from his
imagination), but after the court rules on this question of fact, the best
guarantee of trustworthy testimony is not to be found in allowing the
trial judge discretion to deny production of the writing to the adverse
party. Clearly, the purpose behind the rule of production is better served
by a statutory amendment that grants an adverse party the absolute right
to inspect all nonprivileged information contained in the refreshing writing that is pertinent to the subject matter of the witness' testimony. In
this way the adverse party will have the greatest amount of relevant information with which to test the credibility of the witness' testimony on
cross-examination.
The second argument in support of a discretionary application of the
rule of production maintains that such an approach is necessary as a
safeguard against use of the rule as a pretext for wholesale exploration of
an opposing party's files. 4 This is a legitimate concern that is not new to
92. 3 WIGMORE, supranote 1, § §755, 765.
93. McCoRMicK, supra note 1, §9, at 17; 3 WiGMORE, supra note 1, §758; Maguire
& Quick, Testimony: Memory and Memoranda, 3 How. LJ. 1, 2 (1957).
94. This is the position adopted by the House Judiciary Committee which
prompted its amendment to rule 612 of the Federal Rules of Evidence providing for discretionary application of the rule of production with respect to writings used by a witness to refresh his memory before testifying. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Ses3.
7086 (1974).
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the California courts in the context of civil discovery,95 and it could be a
point of attack againt section 771 as it is now written.9 6 However, the
proposed amendment to section 771 developed in this comment would
provide adequate safeguards to prevent such an abuse of the rule. Under
the suggested amendment, not only would privileged writings be exempt
from production, but the trial judge would be empowered to interpose
an in camera examination of the refreshing writing for the purpose of
excising material unrelated to the witness' testimony. Given that production of material in a refreshing writing that is related to the witness'
testimony will be strictly controlled by the court, and that such information is essential to the purpose of testimonial reliability, it can hardly be
said to be the impermissible product of a "fishing expedition."
CONCLUSION

Expansion of the scope of production under section 771 of the Evidence Code was a necessary and desirable consequence of the abolition
of the unnecessary foundation requirements imposed under prior law
and of the limitation restricting production to those writings used to refresh a witness' memory while on the stand. Unfortunately, the strict
language of the statute leaves the trial judge without discretion and appears to permit an overexpansion of the scope of production by making
available entire writings which may not be wholly pertinent to the subject matter of the witness' testimony. The immediate effect of this overexpansion is a conflict between privileged communications and the rule
of production under section 771. This difficulty may be cured by an
amendment that provides a mechanism whereby the trial judge may intelligently rule on a claim of privilege while clearly exempting privileged
documents from the writings subject to production under section 771.
Such an amendment to the statutory language would not only be consistent with the purpose of the common law rule, but would also serve to
harmonize section 771 with those statutes protecting privileged communications. Although an amendment that would condition application of
the rule of production upon the discretion of the court might also serve to
alleviate the conflict with privileged communications, the price paid for
harmonizing the conflicting statutes would be the derogation of safeguards intended to insure testimonial reliability. Under the California
95. See, e.g., Greyhound v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 384-86, 364 P.2d 266,
280-81, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 104-05 (1961).
96. This is because section 771 presently does not expressly provide a means for
limiting the information available to an adverse party which is contained in a refreshing
writing to only that which is related to the witness' testimony. It should be noted, however, that the present language of the statute does not preclude such a construction. See
note 87, and text accompanying notes 86-88 supra.
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rule which permits a witness to refresh his memory from any source and
at any time, the most effective safeguard against false or manufactured
testimony is vigorous cross-examination, and for this purpose the adverse party must have access to the refreshing writing.

David E. Boyd

